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ABSTRACT
The article analyses the implication of private sector representatives in the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MEA) (2001–2005). The article shows that, before this international biodiversity
assessment, ﬁrms were involved in three coalitions: the greenhouse gas pro-trading coalition,
the voluntary private standard coalition and the payment for environmental services coalition.
These three coalitions all advocated a particular style of regulation that gave overwhelming em-
phasis to market-based policy instruments. Corporate experts from the three coalitions identiﬁed
were recruited to participate in the MEA. Thanks to the political visibility given to the ecosystem
services concept by the MEA, private industry was able to strengthen and legitimize its actions
in favour of market-based environmental governance. At the same time, associating private sector
representatives with the MEA process made it easier to disseminate the concept of ecosystem
services. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Introduction
T
HE BUSINESS SECTOR HAS LONG HAD A HAND IN FORMULATING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND POLICIES. THIS WAS ACHIEVED IN
part through its lobbying of national governments and in part through the participation of business
representatives in commissions of international organizations. Industry has often been represented by groups
largely opposed to stronger international environmental protection policies. However, in the 1990s the nature
of the commitment of multinationals changed (Le Prestre, 2005). The participation of private companies in the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Earth Summit, marked the
ofﬁcial arrival of business in international environmental politics.
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Among its various outputs,1 the conference helped to ﬁrmly anchor climate and biodiversity issues on the
international political agenda, by adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). While business quickly showed an interest in climate
change matters, it was much slower to embrace biodiversity questions as a global issue. Nevertheless, a movement
began to emerge in the early 1990s, notably around certain market instruments for biodiversity conservation such
as voluntary standards and compensation mechanisms. This movement continued and, by the end of the 1990s,
the literature and initiatives proclaiming market-based instruments (MBIs) were thriving, despite some confusion
surrounding the concept of MBIs2 (Broughton and Pirard, 2011). A few multinationals became interested in the
political and ﬁnancial opportunities positive incentive measures seemed to offer (and not negative price signals such
as taxes), but such approaches remained sectoral and not widespread.
It was in this context that private companies became associated with the United Nations Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MEA) at the end of the 1990s (Pesche et al., 2013). Beyond delivering a shattering analysis of the
degradation of ecosystems worldwide, the MEA brought into politics a reference that has become unavoidable in
public environmental and agricultural policies internationally: the ecosystem service (ES) concept (Méral, 2012).
The private sector was involved in the MEA through the intermediary of the WBCSD (World Business Council on
Sustainable Development), a transnational group of companies working for sustainable development. One of the
main problems was to develop the credibility of the process by basing it on scientiﬁc expertise and at the same time
to involve stakeholders to legitimate and disseminate knowledge and norms produced by this assessment. Thus, the
MEA can be regarded as a formal effort to assemble selected knowledge to make it publicly available in a form useful
for decision-making (Mitchell et al., 2006). In this way, Mitchell et al. think that global environmental assessments
should be seen as social processes rather than simply in terms of the documents they produce. It is therefore a
matter of precisely analysing the implications of private sector representatives in this international biodiversity
assessment. Thus, there are two research questions explored in this paper: How were private sector representatives
involved in the MEA? And what business interests were served by their involvement in the MEA? With the answers
to these questions, this article complements the existing explanations of the building of environmental global
governance by focusing on the key role played by business in promoting MBIs for biodiversity and ES.
In the following, the argument regarding the role of business representatives in the diffusion of MBIs in
biodiversity unfolds in four steps. First, there is an analysis of the links between the concepts of ES, payments for
environmental services (PES) and MBIs during the MEA. In the next part, the idea of an ‘advocacy coalition frame-
work’ (ACF; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) is introduced as a conceptual lens for studying business involvement
in theMEA, and the methodology is presented. Thereafter, the ﬁndings regarding the above research questions about
the involvement of business representatives in the MEA and the underlying business interests are developed.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Since the 1992 Rio summit, global environmental changes have become a growing preoccupation and global
scientiﬁc assessments have become more and more frequent. These assessments, like the MEA, can be regarded
as a formal effort to assemble selected knowledge to make it publicly available in a form useful for decision-making
(Mitchell et al., 2006).
While the MEA formally took place from 2001 to 2005, preparations were already under way in late 1998. A
preliminary exploratory committee, set up on the initiative of the United States-based World Resources Institute
(WRI), the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), operated from 1998 to 1999.
Its composition was a good reﬂection of the nature of the process, with fairly balanced representation between noted
scientists (some with political or institutional responsibilities), representatives of international organizations – the
1Governments adopted three main documents, the ‘Rio Declaration’, a detailed action plan called ‘Agenda 21’ and a ‘Declaration of Principles, not
legally binding but conferring authority for world-wide consensus on the management, conservation and ecologically viable exploitation of all
types of forests’ (Forest Principles). The Rio summit was also the occasion for the signing of the CBD and the UNFCCC.
2Broughton and Pirard (2011) highlight the confusions surrounding the concept of MBIs and show that there is no archetypal market instrument,
but rather possible derivatives of it, with highly variable characteristics.
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World Bank, UNDP, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), and more speciﬁcally members of the secretariats of relevant multilateral environmental
agreements – the CBD, the UN Convention to Combat Desertiﬁcation (UNCCD) and the UNFCCC.
From 2000 on, the MEA process was managed by a Board that reﬂected the concern to mobilize different
stakeholder categories around the issue of assessing ecosystem degradation: it had the same participant proﬁles
as the exploratory committee, with the addition of representatives of governments, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and the private sector. This multistakeholder aspect of the MEA process gave it legitimacy and was
undeniably a factor in disseminating the knowledge produced, via the various networks involved (Pesche et al.,
2013). The process has mobilized nearly 1360 experts from science, governments, international organizations,
NGOs and companies for more than 4 years, both to contribute to drafting the assessment documents and to
their proofreading.
Ultimately, there were relatively few private sector representatives among the experts involved in the MEA.
However, they were present in all the most inﬂuential bodies of the process. These include the Board: three
representatives out of 49 members come from private sector; and the MEA scientiﬁc networks, notably the team that
drafted one of the synthesis reports of the MEA, because eight authors out of 16 come from the private sector.
Altogether, the outputs of the MEA included a general overview and ﬁve synthesis reports, each targeting a
speciﬁc audience: biodiversity, desertiﬁcation, wetlands, the private sector and the health sector. The work of the
ES Q4promoters did not end with the publication of the MEA reports in 2005 (Pesche et al., 2013): the ‘MEA coalition’
in favour of the ES approach remained active and gradually changed to address the dissemination of the ideas
developed during the MEA. The ES concept was progressively incorporated in international and national arenas
(Hrabanski et al., 2013). Among the MEA’s most signiﬁcant contributions was the proposal of an analytical
framework incorporating ES, now embedded in the scientiﬁc literature3 (Jeanneaux and Aznar, 2010) and in public
policy, and to draw the international community’s attention to the monetary value of ecosystems and the economic
costs of inactivity. The main event illustrating this trend is the emergence of The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative.
Connections and Controversies between the Concepts: ‘ES’, ‘PES’ and ‘MBIs’
The MEA promoted the concept of ES into the national and global realm of environmental governance. However,
during the MEA, the private sector did not attempt to spell out all conceptual dimensions of ES, but focused mainly
on the economic opportunities offered by a payment for an environmental services approach and MBIs more
generally. The links between these different concepts need to be clariﬁed.
At the end of the 1990s, the MEA sponsors shared the conviction that highlighting the idea that ecosystems
produce services was a strong argument for changing decision-makers’ thinking with regard to the growing
environmental degradation which by then was receiving increasing attention from the media. They argued that to
improve human wellbeing, the supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling, soil formation), provisioning services
(e.g. food, timber, fuel), regulating services (e.g. climate, ﬂood regulation) and cultural services (e.g. recreation)
provided by ecosystems must be taken into account.
Recent studies on the history of ES and PES conceptualize payments for environmental services as policy
implementation of the ES concept in a global process of commodiﬁcation (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). According
to the canonical deﬁnition by Wunder (2005: 3), a PES is ‘a voluntary transaction where a well-deﬁned ecosystem
service (or a land-use likely to secure that service), ( …) is being “bought” by a (minimum one) ES buyer, from a
(minimum one) ES provider, if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)’. This deﬁnition
was taken up and commented on in numerous subsequent publications (Engel et al., 2008; Farley and Costanza,
2010; Muradian et al., 2010a, b). In this way, PES are now understood because of the MEA process in mainstreaming
ES into conservation and environmental policy (Redford and Adams, 2009). However, Pesche et al. (2013) explored
the relationship between ES and PES more precisely and showed that two relatively independent and contemporary
processes, at least during the 1990s, led to the emergence of the ES concept on the one hand and the PES concept on
3A bibliometric analysis from Jeanneaux and Aznar (2010) shows a continuous increase of scientiﬁc publications on the topic of ecosystem ser-
vices/environmental services between 1999 and 2009.
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the other (Pesche et al., 2013): whereas the concept of ES is closely linked to a desire of ecologists (e.g. Ehrlich and
Ehrlich, 1981 Q5) to attract ofﬁcial attention to the threats to ecosystems posed by human pressures, the concept of
PES seems to have stemmed from a concern to ensure funding for conservation in tropical countries over the long
term (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2005). During the MEA, the ES and PES epistemic conﬁgurations
drew closer. The private sector and NGOs were more sensitive to the operational side of PES. One of the ideas devel-
oped in the MEA was to counter ecosystem degradation through ‘greater use of economic instruments and market-
based approaches’ including taxes and user fees, creation of markets, payments for ES and certiﬁcation (MEA, 2005:
21–22 Q6). At ﬁrst largely independent of practical experiments with PES or PES-like instruments, the concept of ES is
now closely involved in decision-makers’ growing interest in the idea of MBIs for ES. Thus, MBIs for ES comprise a
large array of policy instruments designed to modify the behaviour of land users or natural resource managers in
ways that maintain or promote ES.
There are many controversies around these three notions (Barnaud and Antona, 2014). Indeed, several papers in
the recent critical geography literature have analysed various PES programmes and pointed out that, although PES
are commonly considered a paradigmatically neoliberal market-based conservation mechanism, most of these
programmes actually do not strictly follow the pure neoliberal vision (Dempsey and Robertson, 2012; Fletcher
and Breitling, 2012; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). Beyond that, there are controversies around the very use of monetized
and market-based mechanisms to deal with conservation matters (Maris, 2014).
One can argue that this is not speciﬁc to ES – some environmental market-based mechanisms existed before the
launch of the concept of ES into policies. However, ES are nowadays commonly associated with the idea of PES, and
more generally with a neoliberal vision of conservation. Matulis also claims that ‘The proliferation of market-based
approaches to conservation is, in many ways, antithetical to ensuring social and ecological well-being’ (Matulis,
2014: 156). However, ﬁrst, Corbera (2015) explains that PES are very rarely implemented to result in markets
(Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013) and, even when they involve private and other non-state parties, they should
probably be regarded as ‘contractual’ transactions at best (Wunder, 2005). If PES rely on state budgets and operate
as subsidies, we are dealing with a public policy aimed at changing the relative costs and beneﬁts of land-use options,
rather than with a new market. Furthermore, MBIs constitute an extremely heterogeneous group that makes little
sense from an economic theory perspective. MBIs as a category look more like an asylum country for all tools with
a price component (Pirard, 2012; Boisvert et al., 2013). Second, Sikor, who seeks to reconcile positions of critics
and proponents of ES, suggests that we should think of environmental management as creating both justices and
injustices simultaneously (Sikor, 2013).
Analytical Perspectives: The ACF in Global Environmental Politics
How can we make sense of the role played by business in producing international policies? In political sciences, the
ACF develops a micro-level view on the role of stakeholders (including business) in international politics, to avoid
decontextualizing the research on international environmental regimes. Peter Haas’s study on epistemic
communities4 (Haas, 1992), inspired by regime theory (Krasner, 1983), allows the consideration of the role of
businesses as knowledge-brokers, co-constructing what is and what is not policy-relevant knowledge. But much
of the epistemic community research focuses on scientiﬁc expertise as an objective form of knowledge capable of
reducing the uncertainty that characterizes environmental problems, and building consensus in favour of
international cooperation (Levy and Newell, 2005). Haas neglects to analyse the contested nature of knowledge,
where private companies and NGOs are actively engaged in supporting particular interpretations of scientiﬁc
evidence (Orsini, 2010). In this paper, it is assumed that corporate expertise is an important currency for gaining
political access, and that corporate expertise can be a way to represent interests (Coen, 2005; Grossman and
Saurugger, 2006; Hrabanski, 2010).
Regime theory remains macro-level views, and it is important to complement it from a micro-level perspective to
better understand the concrete mechanisms at work when companies engage in international politics. The ACF
proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) allows reconciling macro- and micro-level views. The approach is
4Haas (1992) uses the epistemic community concept to highlight the sharing of beliefs of a scientiﬁc type over principles and causalities, but also
a convergence of interests within a group of heterogeneous stakeholders mobilized with a view to inﬂuencing political processes.
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deﬁned as including ‘people from various governmental and private organizations who both share a set of normative
and causal beliefs and engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1993). In this way, the coalition is a group of actors who are bound by a similar belief system and promote the same
policy option. The policy changes are then the results of the balance of power between different coalitions of actors
within a policy system, and/or the learning process inside dominant coalition. In addition, unlike the ‘epistemic
community’ concept of Haas (1992), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) favoured the coalition notion over the term
‘epistemic community’: while the latter suggests the idea of a closed shop, the former places more emphasis on the
open and moving dimensions of the conﬁguration. In other words, from this perspective, business participation in
the MEA was a way for the private sector to be in the science policy arena and to pool frames of reference with
decision-makers, scientiﬁc experts, NGOs, etc. The ACF highlights the role of people in these dynamics. In the
MEA conﬁguration, private sector representatives presented not their companies but themselves and were presented
by others as ‘experts’, just like all other MEA experts. Some of the private sector experts involved later even moved on
to a position in a major NGO, or within an administration. Finally, the ACF enables us to consider the representation
of interests as a long-term process which consists of constructing and sharing common references with multiple
stakeholders. Where applicable, this kind of advocacy coalition is a way for business to be involved in biodiversity
policies. This literature highlights the importance of the cognitive dimensions of stakeholders and also of looking
at the earlier processes through which the stakeholders within the advocacy coalition were selected or excluded.
Methods
This article is based on a broad methodological framework from two scientiﬁc projects (the SERENA and
INVALUABLE projects),5 which deal with the genesis and the implementation of ES approaches and MBIs for
biodiversity. More than 70 experts (international organizations, NGOs, think tanks, governments, etc.) were
interviewed. A part of the study was about the role of the private sector in these dynamics and, more precisely, we
use several methods to analyse the participation of private sector representatives in the MEA. Initially, we interviewed
18 key stakeholders of the Millennium process from January 2010 to January 2012. During its tenure, the MEA
mobilized more than 1360 ‘experts’ around the world, but an analysis of the overlapping responsibilities and varied
degrees of involvement points to the core author team of the synthesis report on ‘Opportunities and Challenges of
Business and Industry’. Among these 16 authors, eight come from the private sector, six of whom we interviewed.
We also interviewed three representatives of international organizations and nine of scientiﬁc communities, who
were on the MEA’s Board or in one of the scientiﬁc bodies (assessment panel and editorial team). These 18 semi-
structured expert interviews allowed us to analyse the trajectories of the MEA process, the motivations of the people
involved as well as technical issues such as the methods of recruitment to the MEA.
Thanks to access provided by members of the MEA Board, we also analysed the archives of the MEA and many
documents produced by the MEA to analyse the different positions around MBIs for ES. Finally, an analysis of grey
literature from the WBCSD, and notably of the WBCSD’s 15 publications produced on biodiversity between June
1997 and October 2010, was the basis for analysing how the WBCSD as an important business organization
involved in the MEA process appropriated the ES concept in a selective way.
Results
Based on empirical research, this paper shows that at the time of the MEA, an advocacy coalition emerged in favour
of MBIs for ES and biodiversity. This coalition was composed of stakeholders from multiple social worlds (NGOs,
national administrations, the private sector and international organizations) who were attempting to develop
market-based regulation mechanisms in the biodiversity sector. The empirical framework also highlights that before
5http://www.serena-anr.org/ and http://invaluable.fr/
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the MEA, the private sector representatives belonged to three pre-existing coalitions already interested in incentive
mechanisms for environmental policy. We show that with the advent of the MEA, the pre-existing coalitions
persisted but a new coalition of heterogeneous stakeholders, based on the three pre-existing coalitions, participated
in spreading the concept of ES and MBIs to promote the introduction of ES markets.
Some Mentors of Business Involvement in the MEA: Advocacy Coalitions Promoting MBIs in the 1990s
Already after Rio in 1999 quite a number of companies became involved in environmental issues. The companies
involved were based on business models that depended heavily on natural resources, and they gradually started to
take part in the international biodiversity assessment in promoting some kinds of MBIs.
From the Greenhouse Gas ‘pro-Trading Coalition’ to the International Biodiversity Assessment of the MEA
Of the eight business members of the team who drafted the MEA’s ‘Opportunities and Challenges of Business and
Industry’ synthesis report, two came from the greenhouse gas (GHG) pro-trading coalition, notably the former CEO
of BP Americas. During the international climate change negotiations of the 1990s, a business–NGO coalition
emerged that promoted emissions trading – an emblematic market-based mechanism (OECD, 1997, 2003, 2007;
Pirard, 2012). Meckling (2011) used the advocacy coalition approach to describe business involvement in climate
issues in the 1990s. The author shows how, before 1990, the dividing line between the coalitions had been between
‘anti-regulation coalitions’ and ‘coalitions in favour of command and control type measures’ (Meckling, 2011.: 43).
Meckling shows how a third coalition appeared at the beginning of the 1990s, the ‘pro-trading coalition’ in favour
of carbon trading. This last coalition encompassed NGOs and business, and was a more powerful lobby group in the
Kyoto climate negotiations than in the European Union (EU). The members of the coalition gradually relied on
scientiﬁc experts and on allies from national administrations (United States) and supranational administrations
(EU) to develop a market-based regulation of GHG mitigation. This coalition was based on a shared preference
for a type of market-based GHG governance as the lesser evil compared to a regulatory approach, and on a will to
develop carbon market instruments, such as GHG emission quotas, by inﬂuencing decision-makers. The leaders
of this coalition included BP and Dupont. In our interview with the former CEO of BP Americas in April 2011,
he stated: ‘When I was with BP we were, you may recall, or maybe you don’t recall, we were very active on the issue
of climate change. And we were instrumental at developing internal trading regimes to help us reduce our own
emissions. I got involved with MBI approaches to solving environmental problems back in the 90s with BP.’
Another expert (anonymous) from the private sector was also involved in the Kyoto climate negotiations and he
also stated, ‘market-based instruments are more efﬁcient and more ﬂexible, that is why it’s better for us because we
are in favour of sustainable development’.
The ACF puts forward the notion of ‘coalition’ as a group of actors who are bound by a similar belief system and
promote the same policy options. Through these two interviews, we can observe that both representatives of the
private sector share the belief that ‘the private sector is a part of the solution for climate change, and my ﬁrm must
be involved in the climate negotiations’, as well as the same policy option, which is the use of tradable permits for
GHGs. They share the same values and the same belief in the efﬁciency of tradable permits and more generally of
MBIs. In other words, in being involved in the MEA, the GHG pro-trading coalition introduced a learning process
inside the coalition in favour of the ES approach, which consisted in promoting environmental market-based
approaches. Furthermore, Meckling shows that, although business could not prevent the control of emissions, it
could inﬂuence the type of regulation in favour of market-based regulation. Business therefore had a considerable
inﬂuence over the style of political regulation, and recruitment of the members of this coalition to the MEA was
bound to facilitate the transfer of public policy solutions from the climate regime (Paterson, 1993; Dahan Damedico
and Guillemot, 2006; Stephens et al., 2011) to the biodiversity regime (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016).
From the Transnational Coalition of Voluntary Private Standards to ES
The second coalition from which private sector representatives were recruited to the MEA was the transnational
coalition of voluntary private standards. Voluntary private standards belong among ‘voluntary price signals’, which
according to Pirard are a category of MBIs that ‘consists in schemes whereby producers send a signal to consumers
that environmental impacts are positive (in relative terms) and consequently gain a premium on the market price’
6 M. Hrabanski
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(Pirard, 2012: 65). Fouilleux showed that since the end of the 1990s, a coalition on voluntary private standards com-
prised ‘collective and individual stakeholders, mobilized by a certain number of common beliefs and values, who
interacted around the promotion and gradual adjustment of voluntary certiﬁcation mechanisms as efﬁcient
regulation instruments to oversee globalization’ (Fouilleux, 2010: 000 Q7). Four representatives from pioneering
companies in certiﬁcation matters were included into drafting the Synthesis MEA on business: for instance, among
the MEA experts, the chairman of Unilever, at the end of the 1990s, had been personally involved in founding the
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), based on the model of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).6 Being head of
the Unilever ‘ice cream and frozen foods’ division and notably in charge of the ‘ﬁsh’ operations during the 1990s,
the FSC inspired him. It was a means to counter the erosion of ﬁsh stocks worldwide which threatened to put
Unilever’s ﬁsh line out of business (Wolff and Schmitt, 2009). So Unilever created, in partnership with World Wild
Fund for Nature (WWF), the MSC which as of 1999 internationally certiﬁed seafood products from comparatively
healthy ﬁsheries. Another MEA expert was a representative from mining multinational Rio Tinto, one of the largest
mining companies in the world. He had been particularly interested in initiatives to preserve biodiversity, notably
through compensation and certiﬁcation. Rio Tinto led international certiﬁcation initiatives in the metals and mining
equipment sector within the International Council on Mining andMetals (ICMM), launched in 2006 jointly with the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The Rio Tinto representative stated: ‘To make sustainable
development attractive to corporate mindset, we proposed some kind of trade-off between economic, social and
environmental dimensions of sustainable development, and these kinds of trade-offs, such as ICMM could become
a model for environmental governance.’ The ICMM is also based on the FSC model. Representation of the Syngenta
Foundation ﬁts in with the same approach, with the foundation taking an active part in international forest certiﬁca-
tion. Lastly, while the Swedish multinational construction and development company Skanska does not depend
directly on natural resources, it introduced certiﬁed environmental management systems as early as 1998 and their
vice-chairman and head of the company’s environmental affairs launched some quite similar initiatives. At the time
of the MEA, Skanska was the largest company in Sweden to have its own certiﬁed environmental management
system. These four experts have similar beliefs: ‘private sector is a part of the solution, and my ﬁrmmust be involved
in the environmental negotiation’ and the same policy option, which is the use of certiﬁed environmental manage-
ment, a kind of MBI. These experts in favour of voluntary private standards are involved in a learning process inside
the coalition in favour of ES approaches, which consists of promoting environmental market-based approaches.
To sum up: all corporate experts involved in the author team of the ‘Opportunities and Challenges of Business
and Industry’ synthesis report had histories in creating voluntary private standards, a kind of MBI.
From the Coalition of PES to the MEA
Lastly, the third coalition from which private sector representatives were recruited into the MEA process operated in
favour of PES. Before the MEA, most PES promoters belonged to quite restricted circles of people from the private
sector and public sector working in intertropical forest zones on forest conservation and exploitation matters
(Pesche et al., 2013). Of the eight private sector representatives co-authoring the Millennium Assessment synthesis
report on ‘Business and Biodiversity’, two had their origins in the PES coalition. The ﬁrst comes from Rio Tinto and
was involved with the Katoomba group, an organization founded in 2000 to produce scientiﬁc data on PES, and
now mandated more broadly to promote environmental MBIs. At the same time, this individual was also involved
in the voluntary private standards coalition. The second company representative was directly involved in the forestry
sector to implement payment for environmental services for a timber industry. Both were members of the WBCSD.
One of the contributors to the ‘Opportunities and Challenges of Business and Industry’ synthesis report was Stefano
Pagiola, a member of the World Bank’s environment department and leading promoter of PES. His presence on the
editorial board for the ‘ES and industry’ report was a factor in aligning ES and PES instruments more closely in the
MEA. At the interface between the science world and the international arena, Stefano Pagiola has acted as a broker for
the idea of PES.7 In the late 1990s he was working with Michael Jenkins, then senior forestry adviser to the World
Bank. In 1998, he founded the NGO Forest Trends, which was to give rise to a number of ‘incubator’ organizations
6The FSC is a certiﬁcation mechanism created in 1993 following the Rio Summit, governed by civil society groups, ecologists and private ﬁrms
with a view to ensuring that the production of wood-based products respects procedures designed to guarantee sustainable forest management.
7Pagiola also participated upstream in designing the MA’s analytical framework.
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that favoured MBIs, such as the Katoomba group (2000), BBOP (2005), Ecomarketplace, SpeciesBanking.com,
ForestcCarbonPortal.com and the Chesapeake Fund. Some of these incubators work to produce scientiﬁc data on
PES (Katoomba). Pagiola and Wunder are involved. The ﬁndings are fed to the satellite organizations working to
set up MBIs that particularly interest some companies and public authorities. As with the two previous coalitions,
the coalitions in favour of PES share some beliefs: the ‘market is more efﬁcient to solve environmental problems’
and the same policy options, namely PES and more generally MBIs.
The careers of some of the MEA report’s authors reﬂect not just the connections between the conservation
economics world, the international political arena and the private sector (WBCSD, Rio Tinto, Unilever, etc.), so
facilitating the circulation ideas on voluntary private standards, PES instruments and tradable permits in different
circles. They also reﬂect growing interactions between the ES and the three coalitions within the MEA process. These
connections intensiﬁed during the MEA because voluntary private standards, PES and more generally MBIs could
achieve more media coverage and reach other stakeholders who might be interested in the approach.
Corporate Involvement in the MEA
The Catalytic Role of the WBCSD in International Environmental Governance
From the beginning of the MEA preparatory committees, two foundations ﬁnancially backed the initiative on a large
scale, notably the Packard Foundation ($0.35 million) and the Avina Foundation ($0.6 million between 1998 and
1999) (GEF, 2001). The ﬁrst followed a tradition of research patronage in the United States. The second, Avina,
is a philanthropic foundation created in 1994 by Stephan Schmidheiny, who several months after founding Avina
established the WBCSD. Other foundations contributed to the Millennium process in a less sustained manner.
To understand the outstanding role of the WBCSD in these dynamics, we need to return to its creation. In 1992,
Maurice Strong, who was Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro) and a former director of petroleum and hydraulic corporations, teamed up with
Stephan Schmidheiny, a wealthy Swiss businessman, to develop links between the international environment
community and the private sector. Strong awarded him the post of Principal Advisor to the Secretariat for Business
and Industry at the Earth Summit. In 1990, during preparations for the Summit, Schmidheiny founded the
‘Business Council for Sustainable Development’ (BCSD), a precursor to the WBCSD, to promote sustainable
development in the business world. He published, in 1992, the ‘Changing Course’ report signed by the BCSD and
the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE) [which at the time represented the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC)]. The report enshrined the role of business in environmental governance, but especially pleaded
in favour of self-regulation by business. According to Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of the Earth Summit, the
report was one of the most inﬂuential documents at the Summit, and more generally the idea was very warmly
welcomed by decision-makers (Le Prestre, 2005). The report highlighted various advantages that could arise from
environmental initiatives, since whatever the examples or approaches taken by the study, and those that it inspired,
environmental challenges seemed most of the time to be a way of improving company productivity and competitive-
ness (Boiral, 2005). In addition, ‘Changing Course’ highlighted the capacities of companies to self-regulate, which
was in line with the suppression a few months before Rio of a binding international code of conduct for businesses,
the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) code. The idea of such a code had initially been launched at
the end of the 1970s but was abandoned under pressure from the ICC and the United States. In its place, the BCSD
approached the ICC, and they both proposed a voluntary code of conduct for companies based on the reconciliation of
economic interests and environmental interests, as promoted by the sustainable development concept (Clapp, 2005).
Beyond the charters that preceded the Earth Summit, the challenge for the BCSD and the ICC was to develop
regulatory methods that would take into account environmental challenges while being primarily orientated towards
the market and based on self-regulation (Clapp, 2005; Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). Following a merger between the
WICE and the BCSD in 1995, the WBCSD was founded and promoted the internationalization of business alliance
dynamics in favour of sustainable development. Links were woven at the time between the carbon pro-trading
coalition and the WBCSD. In line with this constellation, the ﬁrst Executive Secretary of the WBCSD was Rodney
F. Chase, Deputy Group Chief Executive of BP. Vormedal (2008) argues that one of the objectives of the WBCSD
is to establish ﬂexible regulation by the market, and in this respect, the WBCSD proves to be particularly averse to
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the quantiﬁcation of environmental objectives and to restrictive regulation like the pro-trading coalition founded by
BP (Meckling, 2011). In other words, the dynamics of self-regulation studied here were the fruit of coalitions and of
speciﬁc strategies implemented by business in favour of ﬂexible types of regulation.
Recruitment of Corporative Representatives to the MEA
According to the interviews conducted, it was theWRI that was in charge of recruiting private sector representatives.8
Jonathan Lash, who was the chairman of the WRI during the MEA process, also presided over the US President’s
Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD). This task force launched by Bill Clinton had met regularly between
1993 and 1999, produced many publications and became strongly involved in the MEA. Meckling shows how, by
publicizing ambitious environmental objectives, the Clinton administration became a natural ally for partisans of
the companies in favour of market-based regulation assembled within the International Climate Change Partnership
(ICCP), which was the ﬁrst business organization to advocate market mechanisms as part of a climate treaty
(Meckling, 2011). The ICCP’s role was closely linked to the emergence of BP as an outspoken advocate for market
mechanisms (Meckling, 2011). Our empirical researches have shown that the business representatives involved
in the PCSD were those who were also called upon in the MEA. For instance, the ex-CEO of BP Americas, who
co-chaired the PSCD task force on climate change and who was the leader of ICCP, was approached by Jonathan Lash
and John Ehrman (Meridian) to become vice-chairman of the MEA ‘Opportunities and Challenges of Business and
Industry’ synthesis reporting group.
Two essential ideas arise. The ﬁrst is that the recruitment process shows the importance of national dynamics,
especially within the United States, in the international assessment process. The second aspect is that the presence
of the selected business representatives in the MEA arose from a targeted selection processes: only individuals from
companies promoting a certain framing of environmental issues, notably in favour of market instruments, were
included. As Meckling shows, the other companies which were in favour of command and control type measures,
or against all forms of regulation, or were not affected by environment issues, were excluded. Business involvement
in the MEA was by invitation, based on the companies’ support for market environmentalism.
The MEA Process: A Consensus on Market Mechanisms between Corporate Experts
The private sector showed interest in all those economic instruments providing positive incentives, and was
more sensitive to the operational dimension than the conceptual dimension of ES. In the early 2000s, major
multinationals expressed increased interest in MBIs for protecting biodiversity, and even during the MEA process
some were active in setting up PES mechanisms and MBIs. The companies Lafarge and Rio Tinto, for example, were
leaders in ecological compensation mechanisms. From the outset, the private sector actively supported the initiative
via the Avina Foundation, which became one of the MEA’s ﬁrst ﬁnancial partners.
Although the number of individuals from the business sector was not large in the MEA (to recap: three in the
board, eight in the synthesis ‘Ecosystem and Human well-being: Opportunities and Challenges of Business and
Industry’), the depth of their involvement demonstrates the relative importance given to the MEA by leading
proponents of market mechanisms. The two co-chairs of the MEA synthesis reports, ‘Ecosystem and Human
well-being: Opportunities and Challenges of Business and Industry’, were the ex-CEO of BP Americas and Jane
Lubchenko. The latter was on the WRI Board and was well-known for her publications on climate change and
appearances in the United States Congress. She is known to promote the links between science and business to
develop a green economy.
According to the interviews, the different members of this author team had very few interactions, and the report
was mainly written by the two co-chairs. One private sector representative related, ‘one of the co-chairs required
some sections about the corporate image, the reputation and the brand risk, so I sent several elements … In the
same way, I told them that it was important to be concrete, because the report should be useful for ﬁrms, and all
authors’ team agreed … You have surely seen that in the report there are lots of maps and ﬁgures and some others
graphical things … And all these elements were proposed by the chairs, so for us it was very easy, they were very
proactive, for us, it was just to conﬁrm and to be precise about some details…’. According to the ex-CEO of BP
Americas, ‘there was quite a bit of consensus on the substance. So there wasn’t a lot of tension during the drafting
8Jointly with the Meridian Institute.
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of the synthesis, between the authors’ team and between the reviewers, it was very easy, the tension came earlier in
the MEA’. The impact of the coalitions in favour of MBIs and the representatives they sent to the board had an
indirect impact on the framing and the scientiﬁc discussions within the MEA. These people were not involved in
the scientiﬁc discussions but in the synthesis which deals with the business opportunities. In being involved in
producing a synthesis, they indirectly inﬂuenced the framing of the scientiﬁc discussions. They used the concept
of ES immediately as a way to develop MBIs and in this way they inﬂuenced the scientiﬁc debates. Indeed, the
synthesis came after the decision to concentrate on ideas that could be useful to business. The two main topics
marked with tension had emerged earlier in the process.
The ﬁrst of these topics, which created tensions between members of the environmental community and
economists, was about the wisdom of the ES concept.9 The second was the basic question ‘of whether or not you
best solve problems though strict regulation or ( … ) by using market mechanisms’ (interview with ex-CEO of BP
Americas). This question was not debated among business representatives involved in the synthesis, but before,
among the MEA’s board and scientiﬁc panels. In these discussions the idea prevailed that the MBI model could
be more effective, and this result was reﬂected in the synthesis report. The concept of MBIs implicitly acknowledges
companies as legitimate stakeholders, as illustrated by the statement of a BCSD representative and MEA Board
member: ‘For us it was to show, … it was important to show that people could trust us, we had understood that we
were concerned and we have to be responsible.’10 At the same time, for the promoters of the MEA it was necessary
to include private sector participation to emphasize the multi-actor aspect of the MEA and enhance legitimacy, which
became an undeniable factor in disseminating the knowledge produced, via the private sector networks involved.
Selective Appropriation of the ES Concept by WBCSD Businesses: Production and Transformation of an ES Stance
In the following we show how over time the WBCSD, as a particularly relevant business organization in the
sustainability context, appropriated the ES concept and how it took part in promoting the concept, or more precisel,
certain dimensions of the concept in the aftermath of the MEA.
The analysis of the above WBCSD publications reveals a rise in the inﬂuence of the ES concept beginning in
2006. In the 1997 document, no mention is yet made of the ES concept; the text is more targeted towards inviting
companies to play a greater role in international environmental governance. In November 2006, the WBCSD
published a fourth report that marked the take-off of the ES concept – it is in the report title, and occurs approximately
30 times in the text. The document, which was jointly drafted with the WRI, the Earthwatch Institute, the IUCN and
the WBCSD, took up some of the results of the MEA, notably the four types of ES and the 24 sub-services. However,
the ES concept, such as it is presented in WBCSD publications after 2006, has evolved when compared to the
deﬁnition proposed in the MEA report.
Three major cases of creep are identiﬁed. The ﬁrst concerns the systematic association of the ES concept with
monetary valuation, an idea that according to our interviews was controversial within the MEA. But the WBCSD
was concerned with giving real substance to the ES concept, and monetization enabled such concretization. It
assembled a set of actions under the ecosystem umbrella, some of which had not previously been associated with
any ecosystem approach. Under this umbrella certain companies saw their initiatives, such as certiﬁcation and
compensation systems, and measures in favour of ecotourism and reforestation, re-qualiﬁed as measures promoting
ES. Even cultural services, the fourth type, which tended to be overlooked in the early WBCSD publications on ES
(focused on regulation and supply services), eventually come to the fore when the economic opportunities offered
by ecotourism are highlighted.
The second example of creep arises from the ﬁrst, in so far as the emphasis on ES monetization gradually and
‘naturally’ opened up the way for genuine ES markets. In the 2007 report, entitled ‘Market for ES: New challenges
and opportunities for business and the environment’, the WBCSD clearly emphasizes the association between
ecosystems and their monetization, and supports the emergence of some ES markets, to complement the existing
9According to some ecologists, the ecosystem services concept was not really relevant in scientiﬁc terms. It was more a strategic concept to alert
politics rather than a scientiﬁc concept. Some scientists were also worried about the commodiﬁcation of the nature which is implied in the
concept.
10Interview of the BCSD’s representative in Brazil, a member of the author team, in April 2011.
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carbon market. The authors use the term ‘ecosytems services’ almost 60 times and propose three ways of helping to
develop an ES market. The ﬁrst is to draw up incentives for managers to provide more ES, thereby becoming aware
of producing them. The second is to establish tradable permits, and the third avenue to be explored is certiﬁcation.
In the report, the authors even go as far as to identify the ﬁve stages that enable one to become ‘a good trader of
ecosystem services’.
We ﬁnd a third case of creep in the framing of biodiversity challenges and ES. While the 2003 report emphasizes
the role of nature as a free provider of ES, in the 2007 report it is no longer nature that provides ES. Instead, the
report places the emphasis on economic operators or those able to provide such services. They thus must be
remunerated, thereby opening the way for a biodiversity market. In this perspective, large companies become
purveyors of ES subject to remuneration (clean water market, sludge treatment market, ecotourism market, etc.),
thereby echoing the discourse on environmental goods and services that OECD governments and parties to the
World Trade Organization wish to liberalize.
Conclusions
This article contributes to the debate on ES notions and its implementation. The debate is whether the predominance
of monetary andmarket-based tools is inherent in the ES concept or whether it is simply related to how the concept is
used. Opinions differ (Corbera et al., 2007; Muradian et al., 2010a, b; Matulis, 2013, 2014; Barnaud and Antona,
2014; Maris, 2014; Corbera, 2015). Some argue that the concept did not originally have a monetary or market
connotation but was appropriated by economic actors. Others consider instead that the word ‘service’, in today’s
Publication date Title Authors
1. June 1997 Business & biodiversity: a guide for the private sector IUCN/WBCSD
2. July 2002 Business and biodiversity: Handbook for corporate action WBCSD, sources IUCN,
WBCSD and Earthwatch
Institute Europe
3. May 2003 Cross-cutting themes WBCSD
4. November 2006 Business and ecosystem: ecosystem challenges and business implications Earthwatch Institute, IUCN,
WBCSD, WRI
5. October 2007 Market for ecosystem services: New challenges and opportunities for
business and the environment
WBCSD and IUCN
6. November 2007 Biofuels issue brief (publication transversal: ecosystem, energy and climate,
forest products, mobility)
WBCD
7. March 2008 Corporate ecosystem service review (ESR), guidelines for identifying
business risks and opportunities arising from ecosystem change
WRI, WBCSD and Meridian
Institute
8. April 2008 Sustainable Procurement of Wood and Paper-based Products Guide and
Resource Kit
WBCSD and WRI
9. July 2008 Agricultural ecosystems: facts and trends IUCN and WBCSD
10. May 2009 Corporate Ecosystem Valuation: Issue Brief
Corporate Ecosystem Valuation: A Scoping Report
WBCSD
11. October 2009 Corporate Ecosystem Valuation – Building the Business Case WBCSD
12. December 2009 Tackling climate change on the ground – Corporate case studies on land
use and climate change
WBCSD
13. September 2010 Business, biodiversity and ecosystem services: the interdependence story WBCSD
14. October 2010 Responding to the biodiversity challenge: business and ecosystem services
are inextricably linked
WBCSD
15. October 2010 How to value ecosystem services impacts and opportunities WBCSD
Table 1. The world Q3business council on sustainable Development’s publications on biodiversity between 1997 and 2010
Source: own compilation.
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world, unavoidably echoes a market relationship, which is then inherent in the ES concept. In this way, ‘ecosystemn
services’ is a concept to develop MBIs. In this article, we showed that business actors were mobilized in favour of ES
as a concept to develop MBIs.
The preceding analysis shows the role played by businesses in promoting MBIs for ES. The involvement of
industry in the international biodiversity assessment appears to be a part of a strategy to promote MBIs. Before
the MEA, companies were involved in three coalitions: the GHG pro-trading coalition, the voluntary private standard
coalition and the PES coalition. They all advocated a particular style of regulation that gave an overwhelming
emphasis to the private sector and market-based policy instruments. WBCSD representatives and corporate experts
from the three coalitions identiﬁed were recruited to participate in the MEA. Thanks to the political visibility given
to the ES concept by the MEA, private industry had an occasion to strengthen and legitimize their actions in favour
of market-based environmental governance. Associating private sector representatives with the Millennium
Assessment process made it easier to disseminate the concept, and at the same time these business representatives,
by appropriating it, have been able to modify the concept so that ES have become more and more tightly linked to
market mechanisms – in line with their vision of the world, their beliefs and strategies.
In this way, a comprehensive analysis of business involvement in the MEA contributes to a better understanding
of the politics on MBIs for ES. Our hypothesis is conﬁrmed because we showed that the process by which
information is generated and delivered affects the potential of that information process to inﬂuence outcomes. We
demonstrated that businesses inﬂuenced the discourse on styles of regulatory policies. Also, the perspective of
advocacy coalitions has proven to be helpful in analysing the engagement of business in global environmental politics
and more particularly in scientiﬁc global arenas such as the MEA and soon in the Intergovernmental Platform on
Biodiversity and ES (IPBES) (Hrabanski and Pesche, 2016). Transnational coalitions have become an important
vehicle to represent the interests of companies in global environmental politics. By exploring the political and
discursive dimensions of MBIs for ES, this research has demonstrated the inﬂuence of powerful stakeholders in
promoting a concept that is presently becoming central to public policies. Having shown how the link between
‘ecosystem services’ and incentive mechanisms is socially constructed, in line with the strategies and interests of
corporate actors, our examination contributes to a better understanding of the introduction and implementation of
MBIs for ES.
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